The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense agreement originally signed by 12 countries in 1949. Basically, “the parties of NATO agree that an armed attack against one or more of them … shall be considered an attack against them all.” All nicely written, but it’s a bit more complicated when put into practice.

The historic call for collective defense (Article V) was never invoked before September 11, 2001. At first, the U.S. thought it could respond to 9/11 on its own, but the vast cost and complexity of invading Afghanistan, and then Iraq, eventually prompted the U.S. to re-request NATO assistance.

This delay in requesting support cost the U.S. a considerable amount of European goodwill, and ultimately, the kind of military assistance the U.S. needed to be successful in Afghanistan. Late commitments by Canada and the United Kingdom, along with the NATO International Security Assistance Force, left the military operating under unclear, uncoordinated and ad hoc circumstances.

More notably, the intervention in Afghanistan and the way it was orchestrated has caused NATO to reflect and revisit its reasons for existence.

America is hitting NATO hard because it knows it’s not winning this war. Defense Secretary Gates, Secretary of State Clinton and Vice President Biden are pressuring their counterparts with the most robust diplomacy in recent memory.

Just days after President Obama announced the deployment of another 17,000 troops to fight the insurgency in Afghanistan, Gates met with NATO members to try to convince U.S. allies in Europe to contribute to the enlargement of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Although Gates says he received commitments from some 20 countries to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, sending in combat forces isn’t what they have in mind. Instead, they prefer to send more civilian actors into the field to secure upcoming elections and improve governance.

During what defense ministers called an “informal meeting,” I spoke at a conference held concurrently to discuss the future of NATO. There, everyone’s focus was on Afghanistan.

Overall, NATO’s mandate is astonishingly unclear to its members. Thus, to succeed in Afghanistan, or in any future endeavor for that matter, its mission must be reevaluated, redefined and reaffirmed. Also, its performance in the field must be improved.

To do this it must realign. I learned that not only did Europeans have a different view of what should be done in Afghanistan, they were unclear about the role of NATO in the conflict and, more importantly, if they should play any role at all.

As Afghanistan continues to heat up, leaders attending the summit next week have their work cut out for them. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is politicking hard for a new NATO strategy, including military transformation. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's government is facing a vote of no confidence over his decision to fully commit France to NATO, which contravenes France’s long-term desire to stay independent of U.S. influence. Some members are re-engaging Russia by collectively declaring to resume dialogue under the NATO/Russia Council that was created in 2002 (though the Russians seem to be playing hardball by declaring their own arms upgrade), and NATO as a whole is moving away from its traditional isolationism. This is allowing, as Scheffer says, “a broader awareness of NATO to the public.”

Earlier this month, the U.S. defense secretary announced that he would not travel with President Obama to the summit, requiring the President to come suitably prepared with unmistakable goals and expectations. It is already clear that U.S. strategy is shifting toward the tribal areas in Pakistan, and therefore, the U.S. will need NATO to help keep the peace in Afghanistan proper. Obama now needs to clarify how NATO fits into the overall vision.

The first step, as military strategist Carl von Clausewitz would say, “is to decide the kind of war upon which they are embarking.” Any intervention needs goals and a comprehensive approach. To date, the intervention in Afghanistan has had neither. The battle went from destroying Al Qaeda to unseating the Taliban to state building to battling Taliban insurgents.

And now the U.S. seems to be changing direction again. Does Obama know where he wants this war to go? There is always an end to any game, so let’s declare what that end is and set the goals accordingly.

The second step is for NATO to clearly understand what each member can and cannot bring to the Afghans and the current battle. If they cannot send troops, helicopters, equipment or intelligence teams, then don’t promise them. Domestic political constraints must be recognized and weighed. Don’t pretend they don’t exist. Don’t pretend they won’t influence each NATO member’s decisions.

Third, what is the best way to use NATO power to eventually transition the responsibilities of the conflict to civilian organizations and Afghan society? Should NATO be a ‘peacekeeper’ that helps secure a transition? And if so, who are their Afghan partners, and when/how will they be ready to take the helm, allowing the U.S. and other partners to fight the military campaign?

Finally, the military must have clear guidelines on how to manage violence, asking the critical question: how much force is too much? Should soldiers be breaking down doors and forcefully entering houses? How many dead civilians are too many? Commanders must be able to recognize these parameters and draw the line.

Each of these steps allows us to think about how the Afghans and NATO can move beyond the war. Otherwise, forget about regional stability, internal security or a post-conflict environment that transfers ownership of Afghanistan back to those to whom it rightfully belongs.



About the Author
Patricia DeGennaro is a professor, writer, analyst and consultant based in New York City. Patricia’s extensive experience in international relations and economic development makes her a sought-after source on U.S. foreign policy and national security topics. Within the last year, she has spent time working in Afghanistan on provincial governance, capacity building, parliamentary reform and public policy development in the Office of the President of Afghanistan.

Currently, Patricia serves as a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute, Senior Research Fellow for the Center for the Study of Democracy at Queens University in Canada and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs. She also guest lecturers at several universities including the US Military Academy at West Point. She holds an MPA in International Security and Conflict Resolution from Harvard University and an MBA from George Washington University.